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Information technology (IT) enables food retailers to respond more effectively to
fluctuating consumer demand caused by changing demographics and taste. One particularly
important result is to reduce inventory costs dramatically. Such progress motivates retailers and
suppliers to form strategic alliances in order to realize more profit from introducing new IT
systems.  Together with the introduction of such IT systems, however, it is also critical to
establish a well-functioning delivery system between retail stores and suppliers is also critical if
both retailers and suppliers are to actually achieve lower inventories. Such a delivery system
needs to be very well managed in terms of ordering and stocking all merchandise on an item by
item basis. In other words, the IT system by itself will not return real benefits to both parties
without a good physical delivery system. The following cases for leading Japanese and U.S.
retailers prove this point.
This type of strategic alliance inevitably causes some “lock-in” effects that create
potential conflicts among the parties.  This is especially true if the retailers aggressively pursue a
higher level of sales by introducing Private Brand (PB) merchandise because they are not fully
satisfied with the performance of Nationally Branded (NB) merchandise. Therefore, good
incentive reward systems, supporting supplier's merchandise under certain market conditions, are
needed for both parties to continue the strategic alliance. Since E-commerce should flourish
across the world in the 21st century, the effect of E-commerce on food retailing is also discussed,
though it is expected that its penetration of food sales will be slower than in other sectors.
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4Introduction: Objectives of this Benchmarking Study
This food retailing case study for Ito-Yokado (IY) was completed under a three-year
research grant from the Sloan Foundation. The project’s purpose was to examine, in a
series of case studies, how US and Japanese firms who are recognized leaders in using
information technology1 to achieve long-term sustainable advantage have organized and
managed this process. While each case is complete in itself, each is part of the larger study.2
This case for a leading Japanese food retailer, together with other cases,3 suppo ts an
initial research hypothesis that leading software users in the US and Japan are very sophisticated
in the ways they have integrated software into their management strategies. They use it to
institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis. In
Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and semi-customized software
(Rapp 1995), but is changing towards a more selective use of package software managed via
                                         
1
 In this paper and the overall study, the terms “software, information technology (IT) and systems” are used interchangeably.
Further, when referring to the whole firm, the text uses “it”, but when referring to management, “they” is used.  Food retailing in
Japan covers food sales in convenience stores (CS) and general merchandise supermarkets (GMS).
2 The industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), pharmaceuticals (Takeda and
Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and
Nationwide), autos (Toyota), steel (integrated mills and mini-mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan
and Federated).  Nationwide has replaced USAA, as the latter was unable to participate. These industries and cases were generally
selected based on the advice and research of specific industry centers funded by the Sloan Foundation. These are the computer and
software center at Stanford, the semiconductor and software centers at Berkeley, the financial services center at Wharton (University of
Pennsylvania), the pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon, and the food services project at the
University of Minnesota. The case writer and the research team for this case thus wish to express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation for making this work possible and to the Sloan industry centers for their invaluable assistance. They especially appreciate the
time and guidance given by the food research center at the University of Minnesota as well as the staff at Ito-Yokado (IY) who were
generous with their time. Still, the views expressed in this case are those of the author and not necessarily those of IY or its management.
3 This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed. See footnote 2.
5customized systems. This is seen for this case in Ito-Yokado’s development of increasingly
sophisticated systems to automate, manage, and integrate its different stores. In turn, US firms,
such as Merck, who have often relied more on packaged software, are customizing more.  This is
especially so for the systems needed to integrate software packages into something more closely
linked with the firm’s business strategies, mark ts, and organizational structure.
Thus, coming from different directions, there appears some convergence in approach by
these leading software users. The cases thus confirm what some other analysts have
hypothesized; a coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful information
technology (IT) strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).4 These strategic links for Ito-Yokado and the
Japanese food retailing industry are presented in the following case.5
This is because this case along with the other cases also illustrates that the
implementation and design of each company’s software and software strategy is unique to its
                                         
4
 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working paper: William
V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The Emergence of Controlled
Production,” December 1998. Also see: William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Using Information
Technology: Emergence of Controlled Production,” Bes  Papers Proceedings, Association of Japanese Business Studies, Salt
Lake City, UT, June 1999.
5 All the cases are being written with a strategic focus.  That is, each examines a firm’s IT strategy rather than the specific
software or IT systems used. In this sense, they illustrate how IT is used to improve competitiveness rather than what specific
software a firm is using. The latter is generally only noted to illustrate and explain the former. This emphasis was not specified
when the project began but has evolved as research has progressed. There are three major reasons the cases have become focused
this way. First, at a detailed level, all these firms have unique software and IT systems due to the way each weaves organization
with packaged and custom software. There is thus little others could learn if a case just explained each firm’s detailed IT system
or systems. Further, the cases would be long and would quickly drown the reader in data since IT pervades all aspects of these
very large corporations. This was apparent at an early stage in the study when the project team tried to develop IT organization
charts for Takeda, Merck, and NEC. The second reason is that, at a general level, differences in firm IT systems can be almost
trivial since there are only a limited number of operating system options, e.g. IBM mainframes, Unix workstations, and Windows
or MAC based PCs.  Third, information technology changes very rapidly and thus each firm is constantly upgrading and evolving
its systems. So detailed descriptions of each IT system would rapidly become obsolete. For these reasons, focusing the cases on
strategic principles developed as the best way to explain to readers something they could use and apply in their own situations.
This reasoning has been confirmed when the material has been presented in different forums as discussants have commented
favorably on the approach. Equally important, in the interviews and conversations with management, this is where they have
focused their responses. That is, as the various cases illustrate, the firms manage their IT decision-making by following a set of
strategic principles integrated with their view of their competitive environments. This is similar to Nelson and Winter's (1982)
rules and routines for other kinds of management decisions and innovations, and illustrates these firms’ evolutionary approach to
IT use and development. Their basic reasons for this incorporate the points noted above, i.e. each firm’s unique system, the
limited operating system options, and IT’s rapid technical change. Based on what the case study teams have learned, therefore, it
is these firms’ strategic approaches, including the concept of controlled production explained later, that seem to have the widest
applicability and offer other organizations the most potential insights without becoming dated in how to use IT to improve
competitiveness. The detailed strategy described here for IY, though, only applies to food retailing in Japan.
6competitive situation, industry, and strategic objectives. These factors influence how each firm
chooses between packaged and customized software options for achieving specific goals, and
how each measures its success. Indeed, as part of each firm’s strategic integration, Ito-Yokado
and the other leading software users interviewed have linked software strategies with overall
management goals.  This is achieved through clear mission statements that explicitly note the
importance of information technology to firm success.
Each has coupled this view with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT
(information technology) support group participation in the firm’s business and decision making
structure. Thus, for firms such as IY, the totally independent MIS department is a thing of the
past. This may be one reason why IY had worked exclusively with Nomura Research (NRI) in
developing its systems over the last 20 years. The company’s very successful business
performance in food retailing is not, however, based solely on software. Rather, as described
below, software is an integral element of the firm’s overall management strategy with respect to
sourcing, distributing, and selling food and other convenience items to its customers throughout
7Japan. It also plays a key role in serving corporate goals, such as enhancing store and employee
productivity by improving supply scheduling, reducing inventories, and strengthening customer
relations. These systems are thus coupled with an appropriate approach to marketing, sourcing,
customer service, new product development, and constant cost reduction that reflects IY’s clear
understanding of its business, its industry, and the firm’s competitive strengths in this context.
This clear business vision, especially the strategic emphasis on continued cost reduction,
lower overheads, and higher turnover described below, has enabled IY’s management to select,
develop, and use the software they believe is required to assist IY’s stores to operate at a higher
and more consistent level of performance and customer satisfaction. In turn, IY has integrated
this support to its stores into a total information system for the firm that is linked with the
company’s overall operations. Since this vision has also impacted other corporate decisions, IY
seems to have good human resource and financial characteristics too. (See Appendices I & II on
Strategy & Operations as well as Firm & Industry Data).
Ito-Yokado does, however, share some common concerns with other leading software
users. An example of this is the creation of large, proprietary, interactive databases that promote
automatic feedback between various stages of the order, supply, transport, delivery, and sales
processes. IY’s ability to use IT to economize on traditional delivery systems and inventory
practices, such as the amount of food or other products that must be held to meet daily or even
hourly demand, is also a common theme for other leading software users. In addition, IY has
been able, organizationally and competitively, to build beneficial feedback cycles or loops that
increase productivity in areas such as customer service and product availability, while reducing
cycle times, improving supply channels and increasing customer sales.
8IY’s Management recognizes that better cycle times between anticipated customer
purchases and product delivery reduce costs and improve business forecasts.  This is because
projections are for shorter and shorter periods, usually less than 24 hours. Customer satisfaction
is therefore enhanced while inventories, lost sales, and wastage are held o a minimum.
Therefore, software systems and inputs are critical parts of IY’s and other leading users’ overall
business strategies. There are strong positive results for doing it well, and potentially negative
impacts on competitors.
In this regard, IY appears to be a leader in a possible new production paradigm,
“controlled production” (“CP”). It has developed an approach that uses IT to capture significant
improvements in productivity via a “controlled” production system that requires it to monitor,
control, and link every aspect of supplying and delivering its products and services, including its
external environment. Indeed, IY seems to be at the very forefront in developing this approach
for food and convenience store retailing, and “CP” is very much a part of its longer-term
strategy. This is because controlled production requires actively using IT systems the way IY
does, both to continuously monitor and control functions that are part of an organizational
structure that responds to changes in expected or actual consumer demand and to then use IT to
actually influence or stimulate those changes in demand. This can only happen when IT is
integrated with the firm’s total business environment, internal and external, from an operational
and organizational standpoint, as is the case for IY. That is, this requirement very much reflects
IY’s overall business strategy and its clarity of competitive vision that seeks to actually impact
its external environment to its competitive advantage.
Therefore, IT systems are integral to the way IY organizes, delivers, and supports its
stores and its retail food and convenience item business in terms of product/service development,
9ordering, and supply through to delivery and repeat sales support. This sequence is particularly
critical in food retailing, where the demand and supply for particular products can shift according
to the customer’s situation, e.g. the weather, and where wastage as well as the opportunity cost of
lost sales can both be expensive. That is, as daily conditions affect the demand for particular
items or services differently, the mix of products and services demanded by IY’s customers is
constantly shifting. This is why predicting and efficiently supplying these shifting needs with the
aid of IT has been critical to IY’s competitive success.
In IY’s case, as with the other leading software users examined in this case study series,
the key to using software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and customized software
that supports the firm’s business strategies and differentiates it from competitors. IY’s
management has done this by using IT to continually enhance IY’s existing organizational
strengths as an efficient provider of food and convenience items through its approximately 8000
outlets. At the same time, they have rejected the idea of trying to adapt its organizational
structure to the software used.
They have also looked to functional gains to justify the additional expense incurred in
customizing certain systems.  These expenses include the related costs of integrating customized
and packaged SW into a single information system while training employees to use it. This
integration is done by first assessing the possible business uses of software within the
organization and its operations. Particular focus is placed on IT’s role in enhancing IY’s core
competencies: anticipating, sourcing, supplying, delivering, and selling several different types of
prepared and packaged food, as well a other high turnover convenience items. Management,
therefore, does not accept the view that IT systems are generic and are best developed by outside
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vendors who achieve low cost through economies of scale and who can more easily afford to
invest in the latest technologies.6
Approach: Methodology and Questions
In undertaking this and the other case studies to assess the importance for each firm of the
issues noted above, the project team sought to answer key questions while recognizing firm,
country, and industry differences.  These have been explained in the summary paper referenced
in footnote 4. They are set forth in Appendix I as well, where IY’s profile is presented based on
interviews with the company and other research. Readers, who wish to assess how IY’s strategies
and approaches to using IT address these issues, may wish to review the summary prior to
reading the case. For others, the profile summary may represent a useful outline.7
                                         
6 Ito-Yokado and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-national pairs of firms
in key industries. In principle, each pair of cases focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an industry where software is a
significant and successful input into competitive performance.  Excepting Nationwide Insurance, the firms examined are ones
recommended by the Sloan industry centers as ones using SW successfully. A leading securities analyst recommended
Nationwide as a replacement for USAA. So all the firms are recognized by their industries as being good at using IT to improve
competitiveness. To develop these “best-practice” studies, the research team combined analysis of current research results with
questionnaires and interviews. Further, to relate these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in each industry
center, the team talked with the industry centers. In addition, it coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in a previous
study to either update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995). This method enabled
the researchers to relate each candidate and industry to earlier results. The team also worked with the different industry centers to
develop a set of questions that specifically relate to a firm’s business strategy and software’s role within that. Some questions
address issues that appear relatively general across industries, such as inventory control. Others such as managing the IC
manufacturing process are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the firm’s perception of its
industry and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software strategy. The team also
contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the
firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided additional data on measures of competitiveness as well as
industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus based on extensive interviews by the project team on IT’s use and
integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in specific industries, augmenting existing data on industry
dynamics, firm organizational structure, and management strategy collected from the industry enters. Further, data was gathered
from outside sources and firms or organizations that had helped in the earlier project. Finally, the US and Japanese companies in
each industry were selected based on being perceived as successfully using software in a key role in their competitive strategies.
In turn, each firm saw its use of software in this manner while the competitive benefits were generally confirmed after further
research. In the case of food retailing, the team was particularly aided by presentations given by the University of Minnesota
group at the annual Sloan Industry Center Meetings from 1997-99.
7
 The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, Industry Related Issues,
Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and Organization, Various Measures such as
Inventory Control, Cycle Times, and Cost Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and Results. The questions cover a range of
issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to
industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational integration, to beneficial loops, to training and institutional
dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons. These are summarized for the Ito-Yokado Group (IYG) in Appendix I.
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Introduction to the Case Study
The general trends in Japanese retailing will be described first to set the context for this
case study. The case will then analyze the (IYG) Ito-Yokado Group’s general management
strategies and its recent strategies on using information technology (IT).  We will treat IYG’s
strategies for its Ito-Yokado stores (IY) separate from its Seven-Eleven Japan (7/11 or SEJ)
convenience stores. The market size of Japanese retail sector has been about 143 trillion yen
including the sales of automobiles and consumer electronic products, compared to about 450
trillion yen for Japan’s GDP.
The focus here is on two major sectors of Japan’s retail industry: general merchandise
supermarkets (GMS) and convenience stores (CVS). GMS sales in Japan are estimated to be
about ¥10 trillion while CVS sales are about ¥8 trillion. The following retailers are listed on the
stock exchange.  Six supermarkets are Daiei, IY, Jusco, Seiyu, Mickal, and Uni; Seven
convenience store chains are Seven-Eleven, Family Mart, Circle-K, Sunks AA, Mini Stop,
Kasumi Convenience Network, and Three F.  In addition, we have one private CVS company,
Lawson, which is the second largest in sales following Seven-Eleven (SE), and is affiliated with
Daiei.
Food Retailing Industry in Japan: An Overview
Japanese Retail Industry
General Merchandise Supermarket (GMS)
Two leading indicators show the recent performance of GMS in Japan: 1) the rate of
growth in GMS annual sales and 2) the annual rate of growth in their floor space. Sales growth in
the 1980s was between 2% and 5%, while growth in floor space was stable, between 2% and 4%.
Sales growth thus exceeded sales floor space growth. This clearly indicates that good economic
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conditions existed during this period when GMS generally enjoyed high performance due to
Japan’s “Bubble” economy.
However, due to the Bubble’s collapse, 1991 was the last year when GMS had such a
positive margin between sales growth and sales floor space growth.  Sales growth decreased very
rapidly in 1992, and actually became negative, while sales floor space growth increased to over
4% in 1992, and then jumped further to above 10% in 1993. The result is that sales floor space
growth in the1990s has been exceeding sales growth. This indicates the excessive investments in
store sites by GMS as well as the lower consumer demand, compared to the1980s, for the food,
clothes, and other daily products sold by GMS.
However, there is a reason why GMS invested so aggressively to expand their store sites
despite a weak economy. This is because of the liberalization in the Large Scale Retail Store
Law starting in 1990. Since then, this law has been gradually liberalized and was expected to be
abolished in 1999. Under this law, large retail stores were classified by size into two categories:
1st and 2nd section. First (1st) section retail stores should have more than 1,500 square meters (or
3,000 square meters only for stores in specific large cities) until January 1992 and afterwards no
more than 3,000 square meters (6,000 square meters only for ones in specific large cities).
Second (2nd) section stores are relatively smaller stores. They should have more than 500 but less
than 1,500 square meters (or less than 3,000 square meters only for ones in specific cities) until
January 1992, and afterwards, more than 500 but less than 3,000 square meters (or 6,000 only for
ones in specific cities). In the 1980s the annual number of registered large retail stores for both
the 1st and 2nd category was very stable, between 400 and 700.  The number jumped to above
1,500 in 1990, however, when the first stage of liberalization began. From then on, the number
has been rising, reaching 2,269 in 1996. This is clear evidence that it was due to changes in the
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law that Japanese GMS started to experience heavy competition in the 1990s from the much
more rapid expansion in store sites than sales.
During the 1990s, in terms of demand, GMS have generally been impacted by Japan’s
depressed economic conditions. But, they have also suffered from the more competitive business
environment due to the increased supply coming from the high growth in the number and floor
size of large retail stores.  Under this business environment, GMS have had to develop new
strategies to struggle with the structural change in their market.  There are four aspects to these
strategies: 1) pricing and merchandising, 2) reducing operating costs, 3) using information
technology, and 4) strategic site selection.
Pricing and merchandising strategies include efforts to sell more imported products,
which are often not only cheaper and but also higher quality than domestic equivalents. They
also include promoting more private-label goods, using the GMS name rather than the
producer’s. For example, imports accounted for 17.8% of IY’s sales in 1996 and 19.5% at Jusco,
while at Daiei, private-label products accounted for 12.8% of sales in 1995.
In comparison to CVS or discount centers in rural areas, it is more difficult for GMS to
lower operating costs. This is because the GMS has to bear almost all the initial investment cost
of opening new stores as well as the relatively higher level of inventories these stores require,
especially of clothing and daily necessities. A GMS can adjust its cash flow requirements and its
profit by leasing the equipment needed for its new stores, but this does not mean lower operating
costs. Rather, the primary cost reduction strategy must be to find the best way for each store to
perfectly control its inventory levels.  Then if must keep to this desired amount, just avoiding the
loss of any opportunity to sell something to a customer due to a lack of availability.
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This is why IT strategies have recently become more and more important to these stores’
profitability and success. While point of sales (POS) information has been easily available for
several years, what is now most important for each GMS is how to design a complete system that
covers all aspects of their business activities, using POS and other information to control
inventories, making a contribution to corporate profits. A good command of IT systems can thus
help avoid leaving unpopular merchandise on the shelves and can more correctly identify what
kind of merchandise a consumer wants at a given time. For example, consumer demand and
behavior at a given store can vary depending on the time of the day and the weather. This
information can also be used to best time orders from producers or wholesalers. Combining
anticipated demands with better-timed supply in turn achieves greater control over inventory
levels. Indeed, the company can maintain and track on a constant real-time basis available data
on sales, net profits, and other important figures, at all its stores. In other words, good
information technology systems for a GMS are really competitively essential since they can help
achieve the appropriate balance between two conflicting management desires: keeping inventory
levels low and turnover high while a low loss of opportunity loss in selling products. These
issues directly relate to a GMS firm’s successful performance.
Before analyzing the site selection strategies of a GMS, one needs first to understand the
recent population changes in Japan between rural areas and large cities. Population started
flowing out of the large cities in 1986 when city land prices began to rise sharply, and this trend
has continued into the 1990s. With this population movement, some GMS, such as Jusco and
Uni, have expanded their new store sites in rural areas, rather than in the large cities. This
strategy has had three distinct advantages. First, there was a scarce supply of large retail stores in
rural areas, the competition there was not as intense as in the large cities. Second, the cost of
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constructing new stores was lower because land prices were lower. Third, the demand for large
retail large stores was increasing due to the population expansion in rural areas. Thus, between
1990 and 1995, the annual change in sales by stores in rural sites outperformed those in the large
cities such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Nagoya. Consequently, Jusco and
Uni enjoyed higher performance than other GMS that were reluctant to expand into rural areas.
However, in 1996 this demographic change began to shift. In that year, the outflow of
population from large cities ended; for example, the population of Tokyo has increased since
1996.  There are two reasons the outflow stopped. First, there have been more employment
opportunities in large cities than in rural cities during the recovery after the Bubble burst. This is
because the recovery has depended more on the expansion of the large corporations located in
large cities than on public works in rural areas. Second, there were more people who could now
afford to stay in large cities and buy residences (“my home”) due to the collapse in residential
real estate prices.
This new demographic shift has had a profound effect on the performance of the various
GMS as one examines the details of their individual site selection strategies. If greater Tokyo,
Nagoya, and Osaka are defined as large cities, then other areas are regarded as rural areas.
Greater Tokyo includes Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures. Nagoya’s area is
Aichi, Gifu, and Mie prefectures. Osaka’s area consists of Osaka, Kyoto, Nara, and Hyogo
prefectures. The data on the distribution of store sites of the six listed GMS in each area, as of
1997, shows that the GMS concentrated in Tokyo are IY and Seiyu. IY has 60.8% of its GMS
stores in greater Tokyo; Seiyu also has 63.0% there. On the other hand, Jusco is far different in
its store distribution. It has 48.9% of its stores in rural areas, while only 5.9% are in the Tokyo
area, 18.6% in the Nagoya area, and 26.6% in the Osaka area.
16
In turn, the monthly change in Jusco’s sales has been stagnant since 1996, while it has
been noticeably higher for IY and Seiyu between 1992 and 1995. The shrinking sales in retail
stores in rural areas reflect the net outflow of population from rural areas, or at least its lack of
growth. There are two other reasons related to this situation. First, there has been a rapid
decrease in general construction because of declining public works and less new home
construction in rural areas such as Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku, and Shikoku. Second, the
competition among large retail stores in these rural areas has actually increased as a result of the
continued expansion of store sites since 1990.
Other important aspects of the site selection strategies for each GMS can also be
understood if one looks at the long-term prospects for population mobility in Japan. The period
between 1986 and 1995 was a time of  “outflow of population from large cities to rural areas”.
There was a similar pattern of population mobility between 1969 and 1976.  From 1976 until
around 1982, however, the reverse pattern occurred, that is, an “inflow of population into large
cities”.  If a similar pattern occurs again now and the recent inflow into large cities follows it, the
inflow could continue until around 2002. After 2002, the outflow of population from large cities
might start again, though this is likely to depend on a recovery in urban real estate prices.
There is another important phenomena related to the recent inflow of population into
large cities that needs to be considered. This is that population has been moving to the central
city within each of the other rural areas that are not Tokyo, Nagoya, or Osaka. For example,
Fukuoka has attracted population from its neighboring prefectures, such as Saga, Nagasaki, Oita,
and Yamaguchi, while Miyagi has drawn many people from the adjoining prefectures in Tohoku.
Further, both Fukuoka and Miyagi prefectures have core cities, i.e., Fukuoka City and Sendai
City that have recently attracted several new high tech industries.
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Consequently, GMS will continue to have to make very thoughtful and strategic site
selection decisions in the future. They will have to anticipate potential changes in population
mobility in order to benefit from them and they will have to project which region or city has the
best prospect of being more prosperous than others. This means each GMS should develop new
site selection strategies that differ from just concentrating in large cities or just emphasizing rural
areas. One approach would be to try to use information technology and large databases to
compare cities within each area or between areas.  This would be used to identify core cities that
are growing in industrial power and population, compared to other. The GMS would then focus
on these cities in terms of expanding its store sites.
Convenience Stores (CVS)
Convenience Stores in Japan have generally been enjoying relatively better performance,
even in the 1990s, when GMS experienced minus growth in sales because of the increased
competition and general economic downturn affecting demand as explained above.  However,
the sales of existing convenience stores in 1995 (excluding the sales of the newly opened stores
in that year) dropped 0.4% compared to the previous year. This is because of the increasing
competition within the CVS group and against other retail sectors. This situation does not mean,
however, that individual CVS have been losing growth opportunities overall. Given the growing
competitive business environment the time may have ended when the whole CVS sector could
enjoy huge growth opportunities, but the better managed CVS still have a chance to grow faster
than the CVS that lack good management. This can be seen in the fact that in 1996 sales of
existing stores resumed their rise, partly because CVS could start to provide financial and other
services to their customers, due to deregulation in those sectors. In turn, as Japan’s Big Bang has
continued, there have been several announcements in January 2000 that the CVS will use their
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stores like automated, diversified bank branches. Seven Eleven (SE), in particular, will team up
with NEC, Nomura (NRI), Sony, Mitsubishi/BOT, Sanwa and Bank of Yokohama to offer not
only automated cash services but also access to on-line brokerage, and Sony’s new life and auto
insurance products.8
These kinds of initiatives, when combined with the liberalization of the Large Scale
Retail Store Law and depressed economic conditions have caused a lot of trouble for small and
medium-sized family retail stores. Therefore, these stores now have very strong incentives to
join the franchise network of a CVS. The small family retail stores that are licensed to sell liquor
have a particular advantage in this respect. The CVS that wanted to create more new franchise
stores have been offering them good opportunities. The result is that more than half of the newly
opened franchise stores have permission to sell liquor. With such a business environment, CVS
chains have managed to continue to expand their franchise stores. In 1996, Seven Eleven
increased its net number of franchise stores by 502. In the same year, the net increase in
Lawson’s stores was 569, and in Family Mart’s 413. This level of net increases was a record.
With that recent surge in the number of CVS stores in Japan, the total number in 1996
was 48,567, with a population per store of 2,572.  Before 1991, a population ratio of 3,000 per
store was regarded as a critical competitive level: that ratio continued to fall ever since. Indeed,
one CVS store in Tokyo has a population of 2,012, while one in Osaka only has a population of
1,819 per CVS store. In the U.S., 1984 was the first year when the population per CVS store
dropped below 3,000. There the CVS then struggled to cover the decline in sales of existing
stores by opening new stores in areas with relatively few CVS, resulting in even more intense
                                         
8 IY has indicated it may open this proposed banking business to insurance companies and foreign banks too, ultimately reducing
its stake to 10%. The stated purpose is to engage in account settlement services and act as sales agent for insurance and
investment trusts at no risk, effectively converting IY’s roughly 1000 GMS and SEJ’s 8000 CVS in automated branches of these
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competition. Consequently, Southland Corporation (at that time owner of 7/11) and Circle K got
into trouble in 1991, seven years after the number of persons per CVS first fell below 3,000.
However, in terms of the competitive situation in Japan illustrated by these numbers, one
must distinguish between high quality stores, represented by the franchise stores under the
control of the listed CVS companies, and lower quality stores, that are termed CVS just because
they are open for 24 hours. That is, the total number of CVS stores, 48,567, includes every type
that just satisfies the minimum CVS definition. Of these, only about 32,000 stores are estimated
as actually providing the standard CVS service to its customers. Therefore, the population per
high quality store may actually be around 4,000. So, in terms of quality operations, there may be
an opportunity to add as many as 10,000 stores. At the current rate of expansion, Japan will
almost reach that number in 2001, signaling the start of real competition between high quality
stores.
At the same time, it is the low quality stores, most of which do not belong to a franchise
network, that are on the verge of closing because of too severe competition. The number of such
closures in 1996 was 1,486, equal to 45% of the 3218 newly opened stores. Though listed CVS
companies are doing some scrap and build of their existing franchise stores, the number of
scrapped stores per a listed CVS has only been about 100 per year, on average, or about 20% of
new openings. Therefore, most closed stores have belonged to non-listed CVS chains that
probably have only 200 stores, and have difficulty developing true niche strategies. As the
following figures indicate, the share of the five listed CVS companies plus Lawson has been
rising since the mid-1980s. It was 21.4% in 1985, 29.6% in 1990, 40.3% in 1995, and 42.8% in
                                                                                                                              
institutions. Its main strategic interest seems to be acting as a payment channel: that will create store traffic, that will generate
payment fees to increase the return on its IT investment, and that will be a payment convenience for customers.
20
1996. Thus, their share in 1996 is almost twice that in 1985. So, the CVS market in Japan is now
becoming an oligopoly, just as happened in the U.S. in the mid-1980s.
Given the above analysis, listed CVS chains are moving towards a new and more
competitive business environment in the next century. In this situation, their performance will
really depend on their strategies for the future. Examining the prospects for the CVS business
from a similar perspective to the one used to analyze the GMS sector, the following strategies
seem critical for any CVS. First, is its merchandising strategy; second, is its use of information
technology; third, is its strategic site selection in terms of merchandise; and fourth, is owner
selection for its franchise stores.
The process of deregulation in the coming century will definitely increase the kinds of
merchandise and services CVS will offer on their shelves and in their stores. Sales of rice and
stamps were allowed in 1996. Foreign exchange services started in April 1998, with the ongoing
liberalization of the foreign exchange law. Furthermore, they may be able to sell pharmaceutical
products in the near future. Reservation services for travel packages, including air, train, hotels,
and so on, will also be available at a CVS. Many already have fax and copy services and act as
outlets for delivery companies. In addition to payment services for electricity, gas and water
started in 1987, more and more banking and financial services will be possible.  This will be due
to the rapid speed of deregulation combined with the demographic changes that make shoppers
more receptive to using a CVS to meet their service requirements on a 24 hour basis. Indeed,
working couples, needing financial services outside normal banking hours, have already been
targeted by firms such as Sanwa Bank in terms of their expanded automated branch network
(Rapp 1999a). Therefore, the potential opportunities for the large CVS in Japan look very
promising.
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The ability of individual stores and their personnel to handle this wide-range of new
services is, however, not clear. For example, when game software was permitted to be sold at
CVS in 1996, software producers selected them on the basis of their distribution power. This
power, in turn, depends on how large the franchise network is, and on how well the distribution
system works between the distribution center and individual stores. The implication is that,
although a CVS may be able to offer many more items and services in the near future, not all
chains may be able to offer them, due to limited management experience with such new products
and services or the poor quality of some stores in the chain.
Further, many of these new products and services, especially financial products and
services are very IT intensive. Therefore, with respect to information strategies, the same
arguments hold true as for GMS, but with an additional emphasis on high speed internet
connections to keep customer turnover flowing, while also increasing same store traffic. That is,
the store wants the customer to buy lunch and a carton of milk while checking bank balances or
trading stocks. Further, POS information, weather information, and event information in the
neighborhood are even more critical to the sales of a CVS than for a GMS. This is because the
number of items on the shelves at a CVS are much fewer than in a GMS (30,000 items versus
over 100,000), and most of the items at a CVS are fast food and everyday products. So, the daily
forecast of customer demand is much more important for the good performance of a CVS.
Therefore, it is very important that the information center provide as much information as
possible to each store to update its daily expectations, including expected weather conditions.
As for site selection, the best strategy for CVS site selection is to focus on a small area
and have as many of its franchise stores within each area as possible. This strategy is called
“area-dominance.”  It can bring a CVS the following advantages. First, the distribution system
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between the distribution center and each store will be more efficient because each store is located
not too far from another store. Second, the name of the CVS chain will be better recognized in a
small area. Third, the support services for each franchise store by the advisory CVS staff is more
efficient because each advisory staff supervises a smaller area. Fourth, the dominance by one
CVS chain in a small area can prevent the entrance of the other CVS into the same area.
Related to site selection, the selection of the franchisee is considered to be more
important than any other aspect of CVS strategy. The recent increased competition among CVS
firms for new franchise stores in promising areas has reduced the average quality of the
franchisees and the CVS stores. Furthermore, the staffs of some CVS chains, which are
responsible for developing new stores and advising new franchise owners on store management,
are not always competent. For example, each CVS chain investigates new sites and franchisees
in terms of many risk factors, but the number of these risk factors ranges between 5 and 120 for
the listed CVS companies. Therefore, it is likely that some portion of new storeowners are not as
qualified as franchisees as existing storeowners. These stores are more likely to have difficulties
in the near future, if the business environment becomes unfavorable, given the new competitive
environment. This will constrain the management of these CVS companies because the cost of
closing a franchise store is much heavier than the cost of opening one.
CVS firms will also have to pay more attention to the content of the contract between the
CVS and the franchisee. The presumed sales volume in the contract varies substantially with
each CVS company. Indeed, one listed CVS company and its franchisees have been struggling in
court over the content of the franchise contract since the summer of 1996. The franchisees have
insisted that the prospect of sales the CVS indicated to them, before signing the contract, was
wrong.  They have also criticized the CVS for not having enough provisions in the contract in
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terms of the on the necessary advisory support coming from the CVS to the franchisees. In sum,
if the sales of a franchise store do not rise smoothly, any gaps in the initial contract between the
CVS and the storeowner will often become problematic. If this kind of situation is extensive, it
can adversely affect the whole franchise system of a CVS. So, all CVS will need to increase their
efforts to clarify every provision in their standard franchise contracts to prevent such problems.
This will also be necessary to clarify responsibilities as they enter new products and services,
especially in such financial areas as ATMs, on-line banking and brokerage, and life and auto
insurance.
Ito-Yokado (IY) Group's IT Strategies
Overview of IY Group’s Efforts Using Information Technology (IT)
While IT is not the sole strategic criteria needed for success as a GMS or CVS, it is
clearly one of the major critical elements needed for inventory control, supply ordering, and
customer profiling. It will become even more important as the large CVS companies move into
IT-intensive areas, such as financial services or web access. Further, because IT directly ties each
store or franchise owner with corporate management, it is the link between different strategic
elements impacting the company. Ito-Yokado has realized this fact from a very early period, and
believes that maintaining and improving this advantage will be key to its competitive success
against other large GMS and CVS firms in the emerging more competitive environment
described above. In this sense, IT and its corporate group strategy are closely tied.
The company has been far ahead in the information game since 1982.  At that time it
decided to eliminate slow-selling goods from its shelves, using an inventory-control system
pioneered by Seven-Eleven Japan. Using technology developed in the U.S., the company read
bar codes at the cash register and constantly checked the popularity of every item in the store.
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This detailed, item-by-item information was then downloaded to help the company decide
whether to continue stocking an item or to cancel an order. This data was also sent to
wholesalers, distribution centers, and manufactures who supplied IY’s stores.
For this information system to function well, wholesalers needed to invest in their
information infrastructure, too. Therefore, Ito-Yokado, in its push for profitability, has been
trying to drop inefficient wholesalers and has requested that the ones that remain invest in new
information systems, capable of meeting the needs of Ito-Yokado’s system. The objective is to
enable IY to constantly raise its IT standards and their effectiveness in meeting corporate goals,
such as lower inventories and fewer lost sales in order. It was tough for many wholesalers to
make such huge investments to upgrade their IT systems to supply Ito-Yokado. However, they
could not refuse, since, otherwise, they would have been dropped as suppliers and gone out of
business.  However, once they had invested and met IY’s high standards, the wholesalers soon
appreciated the feedback they received from the quick and precise sales data supplied
automatically via their links to IY’s system. Manufacturers also benefited, improving their
understanding of what customers wanted. They could instantly find out which goods were
selling. and how well they were selling, through connecting their systems to Ito-Yokado’s
information network.
Since this system could presumably prevent the accumulation of large inventories, Ito-
Yokado in 1990 declared it would no longer return unsold merchandise to wholesalers, a move
unprecedented in Japan. Mr. Suzuki, Ito-Yokado president, thus took the risk of keeping unsold
products and sometimes offering discounts; his strategy then gave good incentives for the
company to sell everything it received from wholesalers or manufactures. Further, he could
demand and receive lower prices, since wholesalers and manufacturers no longer had to bear the
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risk and expense of returned goods. Since part of its strategy has also been to sell more
proprietary or private-label products, IY has also tried to improve its ability to develop new
products. The precise data gathered by its information system has been very helpful in this regard
by both excluding products not likely to sell and indicating potential new products that should
become popular.
In addition, the company wants to take further steps to develop brand new merchandise
for itself, or in cooperation with foreign counterparts, using the wealth of information it has
about Japanese consumer tastes and their consumption habits, by type of store and time of day.
For this purpose, Ito-Yokado teamed up with Wal-Mart of the US, in 1993, and Germany’s
Metro, in 1994, to exchange information on retailing, products, and markets.
Seven-Eleven (7-11) Japan was of course the first to succeed in this kind of strategy with
fast food and lunch box manufactures, but IY has now extended this to its GMS. In the case of 7-
11, the company would meet with those producers once a week to discuss its next new products,
for example, three varieties of a chicken lunch box. It would then share information on how to
make it with all producers, requesting all food producers to create the same menu, and providing
the lunch box for all 7-11 retail stores. (Mr. Suzuki’s sense is that Seven-Eleven Japan has been
dominating IY in terms of how to use IT systems, including developing new merchandise.)
Other strategies of 7/11 Japan that are critically supported by its IT systems are: frequent
deliveries of fresh food; use of different trucks for frozen, chilled, warm and room-temperature
goods; and reviewing and revamping product lines. Mr. Suzuki appears to have in mind very
similar structures for both Ito-Yokado (GMS) and 7/11 Japan (CVS). That is, in cooperation with
outside parties, such as manufacturers or other suppliers, each store can provide unique products
and services to a consumer market that is changeable and often rushing to new attractions.
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Indeed, it is not just goods that require extensive IT support, but also some services.  For
example, delivery services such as the affiliation with Yamato (Black Ca), care-giver meals with
Nichii, NEC and Sony, or financial services such as the tie-up announced with Nomura
Research, Sony, NEC, Sanwa, and Mitsubishi/BOT require sophisticated IT both to track
deliveries and access financial networks.9
President Suzuki’s Philosophy and Approach to IT
Mr. Suzuki, the president of the IY Group, has always had a clear vision concerning how the
retail business should be managed and knows well that IT is indispensable to realizing his
business goals for IYG. His important strategy decisions always entail the need for some IT, as
the previous overview of IY’s information strategy reveals. In this sense, his management
decision is often equivalent to a decision on what IT should be introduced. Indeed, the series of
information technologies the IY Group has been introducing since 1982 has exactly
corresponded to its business needs, and the level of IT introduced has tracked its business
requirements. Thus, to understand IY use of IT to achieve competitive advantage, it is important
to look closely at his thoughts on retailing and information technology. This assessment will also
provide a good introduction to a detailed analysis of the IY Group’s information system.
Mr. Suzuki regards the retail business as a system-dependent industry. Thus, he does not
agree with the public impression that IY Group’s companies are too aggressive in introducing
hardware and computer related systems. Rather he wants the IY group to be considered as
                                         
9 In addition to the banking relationships discussed earlier, IY via SEJ is also expanding into the “care-giving” market to service
Japan’s rapidly aging population. Currently 22.6 million Japanese are over 65. SEJ will enter this nursing care business with 3
other companies via a joint venture beginning in April 2000. The service will deliver food and other items to the elderly on
request through a portable terminal to be made by NEC. The partners are Nichii Gakkan, Japan’s largest provider of hospital
clerical staff, Mitsui and NEC. Someone from Nichii will go to the local 7/11 store, pick up the items and take them to the
customer’s home. So no additional 7/11 staff will be needed. According the Japan T mes, is strategy may “cement Seven-
Eleven’s dominance in the retail market as it takes advantage of its convenience store network, which provides strong
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excellent at using computer systems to meet the needs the group, its suppliers, and its customers
face every day. In other words, he senses that the IY Group should capture very changeable
customer demands in a very precise way by using its sophisticated information system. His
emphasis is clearly on helping the retail business benefit from the computer system, and not on
making retailing a function of the computer system itself.
This view is highly reflected in the way IY has designed the group’s information system.
Mr. Suzuki always stresses that the staff responsible for advisory support to store owners, for
example, not the computer system specialist, should propose what he wants the next computer
system to do for his activity. Mr. Suzuki reasons in the following way. The computer systems
specialist is less likely to know about how the actual operation is performing. He therefore
should not propose a plan for the next computer system. Also, the staff assigned to manage daily
operations should not rely on a system specialist to make a plan. Otherwise, the staff managing
operations would give up their responsibility to solve their own problems. In this way, IY is
coupling their functional retailing expertise with their IT expertise to get the best resulting
vertical application software and supporting hardware that meets their retailing business goals.
Mr. Suzuki’s approach to achieving this integration of expertise in order to get a positive
business result is to force the managers to make their own plans. He then outsources every single
operation for making the hardware and software for the computer system, though this effort is
contained in a dedicated unit within Nomura Research Institute (NRI) with NEC providing the
terminals. People in the IY Group therefore always have to discover what kind of computer
system is needed to implement their plans and make their operation more effective. They then
must exactly explain their needs to the outside technocrats in NRI or NEC, who actually work on
                                                                                                                              
infrastructure for on-line services.”  Further, as the terminal can be expanded functionally, SEJ can easily extend the items and
services to include new offerings such as banking and package services.
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making the integrated hardware and software system. Mr. Suzuki arrived at this outsourcing
decision, as one aspect of IY’s IT strategy, partly because the IY group was short of talented
staff in computer technology. But, as it has evolved, the strategy has brought a lot of benefits to
the IY Group, as well as to NRI, where IY is now the second largest client after Nomura
Securities itself.
Mr. Suzuki has also emphasized the importance of sharing, among all members of the
Group, the business challenges facing it as well as possible solutions. Each staff member in each
section, should, therefore, have the same insights with respect to specific business issues as top
management. Otherwise, Mr. Suzuki feels, the company would be in trouble due to a lack of
congruence between urgent issues facing IYG and their possible solutions and the development
of an IT system that reflects what was really needed to support the Group’s operation. Thus, once
a week, Mr. Suzuki gathers 1,000 operation field counselors who are engaged in advisory
support for the franchise stores to IY’s Tokyo headquarters. He believes the benefit of this
meeting definitely exceeds the cost, because he senses that sharing information among every
member of IYG is a prerequisite to realizing the solutions needed at that moment.
From this perspective, he understands that the issues IY really needs to know and manage
are the ones that arise in everyday operations. His primary focus, in this regard, is on how IY
should control each store’s daily inventory level. He constantly questions why the inventory per
store exceeds the value of ¥10 million, while daily sales per store are about ¥0.4 million. To
answer this question, IY has to know a lot of things about what is happening in each store. For
example, how many and which goods on the shelves are sold each day? How and when is the
merchandise delivered to each store? At the next stage, IY feels it should know, simultaneously,
what services and merchandise and how many of each is sold at each store, each day, and,
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further, at what time each is sold out, or when does it remain on the shelves. In the effort to
answer this series of questions, IY’s computer information system has been developed with
constant and detailed discussions with its outside specialists, primarily NRI and NEC. Still, the
driving force for the information system development always remains the needs of the retail
business itself.
Additionally, Mr. Suzuki thinks the retail business should respond much more quickly to
changes in or the increasing variety of customers’ demand. For example, he feels young adults’
preference rice balls is different from that of middle-aged people. Thus, customers’ age, the
weather, neighborhood events, and many other factors have an impact on consumer choice.
Thus, each store should have a different story about what is likely to happen tomorrow. Each
store will, therefore, need to estimate which items customers will want to buy in the next twelve
or twenty-four hours and order them according to its estimation.  Afterwards, they will review
the results to continuously revise the data used to make these demand forecasts. IY believes this
constant process of revising, updating and analyzing its database, that is, estimation, ordering,
and reviewing, is the only way to respond to customers’ changeable demands. However, IY
prefers to do this retrospectively, that is to just catch up to changes in consumer demand rather
than trying to forecast their future demand in a larger context. From Mr. Suzuki’s viewpoint, the
latter resembles a gamble, whereas the former is based on solid evidence. Furthermore, his
confidence in this strategy is fully supported by actual results, because, by just following this
strategy, approximately 70% of the items on IY's shelves have changed in a year. At the same
time, this strategy never suggests that ordering should be based only on past data. This is why
they are constantly assessing consumer demand based on inputs from the stores concerning
customer requests as well as items that are selling. Further, they are constantly exploring new
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services they can offer that will fully utilize store space. This is the origin of the payment and
delivery services as well as the new initiative into financial services. Importantly, in his words,
ordering is the most constructive and most critical part of the retail business.
Therefore, Mr.Suzuki is very suspicious of supplementary or automatic ordering systems,
which have been regarded as effective in the U.S. He feels this kind of ordering system cannot
respond to rapid changes in consumer demand. From his experience in managing Southland
Corporation, he concludes the IT system in the retail business in the U.S. has actually lagged
behind the system of Seven-Eleven Japan. Although the hardware and software in the U.S. retail
business looks better equipped than its Japanese counterpart, he sharply observes that nobody in
U.S. retailing has an interest in solving excess inventory problems or trying to develop a more
efficient ordering systems, as he has been doing in Japan. That is why, from his view, the
automatic or supplementary ordering system that has been so highly regarded in the U.S. will not
address the issues faced by IY Japan.
In addition, Mr. Suzuki really wants to avoid losing opportunities to sell merchandise
when customers want to buy them, if they are available. This philosophy requires some
aggressiveness in ordering practices. Avoiding such opportunity losses leads to customers'
appreciation of the value of IY’s stores, because the items they want are always available. His
thoughts on retailing and information systems thus appear to be very clear. The next section will
detail how these views have been manifested in Seven-Eleven Japan's recent strategy for its
information systems.  Indeed, it appears that the information strategy of Seven-Eleven Japan may
have outpaced any other company in the IY Group, as well as any retail business in the U.S.
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Strategies of Seven-Eleven Japan on Using Information Technology
Since 1978, Seven-Eleven Japan has had five phases in upgrading its IT system. The
latest phase, i.e. the fifth stage, started in November 1997. So this section will present an
overview of the system’s evolution, with a focus on the latest stage, and will include an
assessment of these systems' contribution to the efficiency of Seven-Eleven Japan's operations.
As its basis, the system makes extensive use of POS data for efficient ordering practices and
control of inventory. The POS data in each store are carefully processed and are then provided in
several forms available on the computer. There are, in turn, three forms for analyzing
information for each store.
First is the analysis of the sales of each item or service in a group of merchandise or
services for the past 24 hours. Take as an example the sales of rice balls. Assume there are seven
different varieties of rice balls available at a store. A graphic analysis screen has accumulated the
quantity of sales of all those different rice balls on the vertical axis, and the time of their sales in
the past 24 hours on the horizontal axis. The quantity of sales of each rice ball item can thus be
graphically distinguished in terms of accumulated quantity. This graphic analysis makes it
possible to detect the time of peak sales for the rice ball group. This graph also indicates the
number of customers who visit the store at particular time, so one can see any possible
relationships between rice balls sales and the number of customers visiting at a given time.
Second is the analysis of individual items belonging to the same group for longer time
periods. Again, take rice balls as an example. Assume, this time, that the store has 12 different
types of rice balls. These items are displayed in rank order, according to their sales for the past
single week or four weeks. This screen also displays the relative amount sold of each item within
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the group. This kind of information is very useful for the store staff to select and order items
during one week from all the items available to be ordered within the group.
Third is the analysis of the change in the quantities of individual items sold dring the
past 24 hours, noting that, to retain freshness and minimize wastage, fast foods like rice balls are
delivered to each store three times a day. This graph displays the sales quantity, the time an item
is sold out, and the quantity that must be thrown away if an item is not sold out for each delivery.
This data also suggests how long it takes each item to sell. The visual graphics of item-by-item
sales and the delivery times are very helpful in avoiding opportunity loss to sell each item and
keeping wastage to a minimum. Both criteria are important, as lost sales mean lost profit, but
wastage is a cost that can substantially reduce food retailing operating margins.
In addition to such processed POS data, headquarters provides information on the
weather, neighborhood events and other external situations to increase the ordering efficiency of
each store. The fifth phase and newest of the system has introduced multi-media in order to make
this kind of information even more visually accessible at each store. These two types of data, that
is, processed POS data and external information, enable the estimating, ordering, and reviewing
process at each store. This process makes the following efficiently possible. First, stores can
eliminate slow-moving items on their shelves. Second, stores can narrow down the items and
services they offer to those that their customers really want to buy, maximizing the use of limited
floor space. Third, stores are better able to introduce more new products, because the two effects
just mentioned make more shelf room for new items.  The end is that the shelves always look
attractive to customers.
Furthermore, because of faster data processing by the latest information system, it has
been possible for IY to extend the deadline for ordering from 10 o'clock to 11 o'clock in the
33
morning. This gives the staff at each store more time to analyze the available information and
thus improve the accuracy and precision of its ordering practices. This is an illustration of the
impact of improved cycle times on forecasting, inventories, and customer satisfaction, as noted at
the beginning of this IY case. In addition, since Mr. Suzuki emphasizes the importance of
sharing information between top management and the franchisees, the latest information system
has also enabled all operation field counselors, about 1,500 staff members, to have laptop
computers. These advisory staff people can then advise storeowners in a more convincing and
detailed way as to how to solve their managerial problems.
The benefits, since 1977, of this evolving and increasingly sophisticated information
system, are clearly shown in Seven-Eleven Japan’s outstanding business performance in terms of
: average gross profit margin per store (in %), average daily sales per store (¥), and average
inventory turnover time per store (days). The average daily sales per store were ¥669,000 in
1997, compared to ¥356,000 in 1977. It almost doubled in 20 years. The average inventory
turnover time per store was 7.7 days in 1997, compared to 25.5 days in 1977. It tripled efficiency
over the same period. Finally, the average gross profit margin per store rose to 29.9 % in 1997,
compared to 24.0 % in 1977. The improvement in these figures is clear evidence of the business
enhancement effects of Seven-Eleven Japan’s information systems on its business performance.
At the same time, the average inventory turnover per store has been relatively stable since
1991, even though the fourth stage information system was introduced in 1990 and the fifth stage
in 1997.  Average daily sales per store have been almost unchanged from 1992 until now, as
well. Therefore, the IT strategy of Seven-Eleven Japan with respect to merchandise may be
almost complete, and could be regarded as no longer effective in improving general
performance. But it would be premature to reach such a conclusion. First, one must recognize
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that other factors have influenced the company’s overall performance.  These factors include the
adverse macro-economic conditions, due to the collapse of the Bubble, combined with the micro-
industry effects of increased competition within Japan’s CVS business sector. Thus, just
maintaining sales and turnover may have been a major strategic accomplishment. Nevertheless, it
is clear that IY intends to increase utilization of its IT system, in combination with its 6,000
outlets, by offering a range of services in addition to its merchandising strategy. This is the
reason for moving into such activities as financial and delivery services.
In this sense, IY understands the economics of software systems and IT-based
competition that depends on user economics (Rapp 1995a). In this situation, the high cost of
developing and installing an IT system are subject to increasing returns to scale, as the system’s
high fixed costs are spread over more users in terms of products and services. That is, each
additional user reduces the cost of delivery to others, by spreading the fixed systems costs over
more and more users. Success is then subject to a beneficial loop of increasing returns and
greater profits. Thus IY’s management’s approach to IT is in fact a dynamic process in that they
are constantly adding to the number of products, functions, and services that their stores can
handle on a 24-hour basis. This is part of the constant strategic upgrading and development of
IY’s IT and store delivery system that has allowed it to increasingly shift its offerings and to
enter new product and service areas.
From this perspective, IY’s top management should consider external economic and
industry factors as given in pursuing better performance. Then the solution to the puzzle of
improving average store performance will be to make the new information strategies more
helpful in enhancing the new merchandise and service strategies, site selection strategies, and
franchisee selection strategies. As explained above, IY has already taken advantage of IT
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systems for some of these strategies, such as expanded services and merchandise ordering.  The
latest phase of its information system, however, does not yet seem to put emphasis on the
relatively new latter two strategies, site and franchisee selection. But, this may be coming.
Supplier Relationships: Theory and Practice in Japan and U.S.
General Theory
The previous section described the IY Group’s basic philosophy and strategy towards the
application of cutting-age information technology to its business. While IY is probably at the
forefront in this respect, in general, all retail stores should probably be willing to adopt some IT
strategy, because they would enjoy many competitive benefits from them (Supermarket
Technology 1999).  One caveat to this dictum, however, is that retailers still need to construct
some kind of inter-organizational form with respect to their merchandise suppliers in order to
realize the full benefits of their IT systems.
The relationship structure between the two business organizations (retailers and
suppliers) as posed by Williamson (1979) can be positioned in a continuum from predominantly
market-mediated transactions to predominantly hierarchy-mediated transactions. That is, retailers
and suppliers may agree to have some inter-firm relationship, in either an explicit or implicit
way, as long as they believe potential gains can be larger to both parties. There are also examples
based on power relationships between the two organizations due to relative economic size, e.g.
Wal-Mart and its suppliers or IY and its suppliers (Pfeffer and Salancik1978). Who controls such
inter-organizational forms can then be a key question in terms of using and implementing an IT
strategy.
Therefore, both these perspectives can provide useful analytical dimensions for analyzing
retailer and supplier relationships. Reve and Stern (1986) point out three of these:
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1) Vertical interactions are the activity, resource, and information flows that take place between
two organizations linked together in a distribution channel. Smooth progress and cooperation
requires both to share a belief that potential gains can be larger than before cooperating.
2) Formalization refers to the degree to which rules, fixed policies, and procedures govern
inter-organizational flows. It is how formal or informal contract rules on sharing possibly
excessive returns can give each party enough of an incentive to keep the cooperating.
3) Centralization of inter-firm decision-making refers to the extent to which the power to make
and implement inter-organizational decisions is concentrated in one of the two interacting
organizations. In our case, either retailers or suppliers may be more powerful in inter-firm
decision-making than the other, but the power relationship can change, depending on the
parties as well as the progress and performance of the inter-firm relationship.
These three dimensions are very useful in evaluating various situations involving retailers and
suppliers, including IY and its suppliers.
The Concept of ECR (Efficient Consumer Response)
With the recent development of information technology and its application to retail
businesses across the world, the relationships between retailers and suppliers have been
transformed. We can say that the epoch-making event representative of the change was the
cooperation between Wal-Mart and P& G that started in 1987. From then on, "strategic alliance"
between retailers and suppliers, on the basis of sharing information on consumers, has been
focused on in the retail sector. Retailers provide POS data to suppliers through the network of
computers, and then suppliers deliver goods for retail stores in a timely and automatic fashion.
This cooperation and sharing of consumer information avoids both inventory accumulation and
the loss of opportunity to sell goods consumers would buy if they were on the shelf. Retailers
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and suppliers, therefore, can enjoy a "win-win" situation as a result of this type of alliance. The
U.S. Food Marketing Institution conceptualized this strategy and suggested its possible gain,
using the key term, ECR (Efficient Consumer Response), and developed a general structure of
ECR that can be applied to broader cases between retailers and suppliers (Supermarket
Technology 1999). King and Phumpiu (1996) defined the following key characteristics of the
ECR system. First, ECR focuses on reengineering activities and linkages in four processes that
run through the entire supply chain: 1) selection of product assortment; 2) product
replenishment; 3) product promotions; and 4) new product introductions. Product replenishment,
out of the four processes, is the most important element of the ECR system.  Computer assisted
ordering (CAO), Continuous Replenishment Practices, and other enhancements in the
merchandise ordering and delivery process are based on the flow of information from the retail
stores to their suppliers.
     This ECR concept is very similar to what Seven-Eleven Japan has been doing for
several years. However, there are also several different characteristics between ECR and the
practices of Seven-Eleven Japan. In the ECR, ordering is done automatically by suppliers when
the POS data indicates that specific goods on the shelf in a retail store are short. But Seven
Eleven Japan authorizes clerks in its retail store, even below the store manager, to predict near-
term consumer demand and to order merchandise, even if this means a change in the type of
goods ordered. The reason for this may be due to a change in weather or a special neighborhood
event. Therefore, this is not an automatic procedure, but requires some judgement by store
employees that needs some level of rationality, training, and experience.
Further, there can be a dark side of this type of strategic alliance if it is based on
relatively inflexible, automatic ordering systems. A conflict between retailers and suppliers can
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appear as a larger and larger percentage of the supplier's sales flow through the particular retailer
with which the supplier has a strong relationship. In the case of Wal-Mart and P&G, for
example, 20% of P&G’s domestic sales are through Wal-Mart. So following the actual "win-
win" situation10 in which they linked information systems, Wal-Mart proposed a co-marketing
strategy to P&G. Such co-marketing strategies generally include manufacturing and marketing
PB (Private Brand) goods. But manufactures such as P&G that have strong NB (National Brand)
merchandise are, generally, unwilling to provide PB merchandises to retailers. This is because
they believe it is a better strategy to provide their products to as many retailers as possible, across
the board, to increase the sales of their branded products.
This is especially true for P&G, since many of their products are ranked as the number
one national brand in their category of everyday necessities. So P&G had no real reason to
provide PB products to Wal-Mart. Hence, P&G has tried to become more powerful in its
negotiations with Wal-Mart after the initial success of their alliance in terms of information
sharing. Their approach has been to try to develop cutting-edge products, which would be so
popular among consumers that retailers could not be without them. Also, in 1994 it established
several distribution centers to make it easier to supply its products to small and medium sized
retailers. Along with these efforts to provide more products to small and medium sized retailers,
P&G started to strengthen its relationships with the other large retailers, such as K-Mart. All
these strategies were focused on reducing its dependence on Wal-Mart for retailing P&G
products. At the same time, Wal-Mart’s continued expansion, both domestically and globally,
has continued to make them P&G’s biggest retail outlet. So the potential frictions continue in this
large mutually dependent relationship.
                                         
10 In a "win-win" situation, both parties benefit after the retailer and supplier are allied as sales increase and inventory is pared. It
is generally true, however, that the retailer is in a relatively weaker position than the supplier when the item sold is a higher
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A similar situation can be found in the relationship between Seven-Eleven Japan and
Yamazaki, the top bread maker in Japan. Yamazaki's sales through stores of Seven-Eleven Japan
are estimated to be about 10% of all its sales, while Seven Eleven Japan receives about 80% of
all bread sold in its stores from Yamazaki. In 1993, Seven Eleven Japan proposed a PB brand
project "Just Baked Bread" to Yamazaki. From the viewpoint of Seven Eleven Japan, the
purpose of the project was to provide high quality bread at lower prices in Seven Eleven's stores
than in Yamazaki's in-store bakery shops. The plan was that 7/11 itself was going to establish
several new factories, each of which would cover Seven Eleven stores in the neighboring area
near the factory's location. It then requested Yamazaki to co-invest in these factories and produce
bread there. The production of a smaller quantity in each of several factories for a smaller
number of retail stores would have enabled the quick provision of high quality baked goods.
However, Yamazaki's policy and position is similar to that of P&G. Yamazaki's share in the
domestic bread market is over 30% and it has never made any PB merchandise for a specific
retailer. This is because the new distribution of PB baked goods in a strong network like Seven
Eleven's could put the high market share of its NB merchandise at risk.  It also threaten i s
existing technology and established distribution network.  Yamazaki, therefore, rejected Seven
Eleven Japan’s proposal.
Since the cooperation between the two companies did not work out, Seven Eleven Japan
started a similar project in Hokkaido, in December 1993, without Yamazaki. Yamazaki then
started providing NB merchandises to Lawson, the second largest CVS next to Seven Eleven
Japan, through its own distribution network and from its existing factories. In this way
Yamazaki's response has been somewhat similar to P&G's towards Wal-Mart. On the other hand,
when 7/11 announced its entrance into financial services in cooperation with Nomura Research,
                                                                                                                              
proportion of the retailer’s sales than the retailers’ sales are of the supplier’s. In the converse situation, relative power is reversed.
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Sony and NEC, BOT/Mitsubishi and Sanwa soon afterwards agreed to invest in the venture.
They saw 7/11’s 6,000 outlets as an easy way to extend their user base by linking IT systems
with IY’s. At the same time, neither of these banks dominates either Japanese banking or
finance, and so has little to lose by supplying PB financial services to IY’s customer base.
The Case of the IY group
Despite the situation with Yamazaki, 7/11 Japan has actually been quite successful through
its remarkably strong cooperation with suppliers in providing attractive fast food, such as lunch
boxes, rice balls, and sandwiches as well as fresh foods and fruits, even though all of these items
are perishable during a day. Indeed, they are currently the number one fast food outlet in Japan,
even ahead of MacDonalds. The key to this success lies in how the company has overcome
possible conflicts between with its suppliers in establishing this type of cooperation.
An important fact is that most of the suppliers of fast and fresh daily food to Seven Eleven
Japan are small and medium sized companies that don't supply national brand fast food items.
Thus, there is less risk of conflicts similar to the Yamazaki situation in cooperating with these
food producers. Still, while such small and medium size fast food suppliers may have less
concern over joining with a specific retailer, some other conditions are nevertheless required to
have the cooperation work well in practice. This is because 7/11 requires timely delivery of these
products to its stores nationwide as well as the maintenance of quality and taste. Yahagi (1994)
has described some of the conditions needed for this system to function well, and calls the type
of arrangement between Seven Eleven Japan and its suppliers "the closed system."  Such closed
systems are characterized by: relation-specific investments by the suppliers, a high rate of
concentration of the suppliers’ business with buyer (i.e. Seven Eleven), and an open and fair
reward system that shares the benefits flowing from the cooperation.
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Although information technology has been one driving force spurring strategic alliances
between retailer and suppliers, as explained above, for both the U.S. and Japan, a well-
functioning delivery system between suppliers and retailers is also indispensable for the alliance
to achieve a "win-win" situation for both parties. In the case of IY and its suppliers, small and
medium sized fast food producers are required by IY to build delivery centers and organize
delivery networking systems only for their business with Seven Eleven Japan. They have to bear
the cost of building a center and a delivery system themselves, and the delivery system should
pertain to Seven Eleven's strategic goals in terms of the area and the product. From 7/11’s
standpoint this not only keeps their investment in bricks and mortar to a minimum, improving
their asset turnover, it also firmly commits and ties the supplier to 7/11’s strategy, stores, and
system. Since SE Japan rents IT apparatus to its suppliers, whether suppliers decide to join an
alliance with Seven Eleven Japan or not really depends on whether the relationship specific
investment into a delivery system will pay or not, relative to potential gains from cooperating
with 7/11.
Through natural selection, both sides appear to have gained their strategic objectives. The
rate of dependency of daily food suppliers on sales to Seven Eleven stores has been really high.
According to Yahagi (1994), almost one third of 7/11’s suppliers sell 100% of their output to
Seven Eleven. On the other hand, large NB brand makers like Yamazaki and others do not
depend on Seven Eleven to such a degree. The daily food suppliers have, in turn, been organized
in a formal way, so they can supply the same quality of food daily nationwide. When a new
lunch box menu is introduced, they gather to determine how to produce it. Such meetings are
periodic, and there is a strong inter-firm relationship among SE and its suppliers.
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The reward system for participating suppliers is clear and stable. For a certain daily food
product, the rate of margin for suppliers is specified as more than 18% of the retail price, which
is applied to all suppliers, regardless of the size of transaction and the area. Such reliance within
the system on rewards based on a high degree of formalization gives strength to the cooperation
between the retailer (IY) and its suppliers. For a similar purpose, IY also has made a greater
effort to team merchandise with large makers, especially in apparel for its GM stores.  Indeed,
team merchandising has actually developed several popular products, such as polo shirts and
100% cashmere sweaters. However, the overall performance of the team merchandising strategy
has not been so good, for the reasons noted above, when the producers of well-known NB goods
are involved. Thus, Ito-Yokado’s approach to cooperate with the apparel or material makers that
are the really top brand in each category, has again confronted these makers' desire to sell their
own NB products. They have less incentive to cooperate with IY than the fast food suppliers or
service providers such as Yamato (Black Cat), NRI, Sony, Sanwa, or Mitsubishi/BOT do with
SEJ.11 Also, given the rapid changes in IY’s product selection and the fact that team
merchandising is often only a spot transaction for a specific merchandising project, IY cannot
promise to continue buying such merchandise on a long-term basis from one particular maker, as
is true for fast food.  This situation reduces a supplier’s incentive to make the required
                                         
11 Complementing this approach was IY’s Internet strategy reported in February 2000 that it had joined with 7 other companies
to forma joint venture to supply merchandise services over the Internet, which ultimately could tie with their care-giver program
too. Services will include travel, music, mobile communications, publications and automobiles. Capitalized at 5 billion yen, “7
dream.com” is owned 51% by SEJ, 13% each by NEC and NRI, and 13% Sony (split between Sony Corp and Sony Marketing
Japan) plus 2% each JTB and Kinotrope. The website opens in June 2000. Multimedia terminals will be installed in SEJ’s 8000
convenience stores starting in October and all 7/11 outlets will have terminals by spring 2001. Customers will be able to order
over their mobile phones, which Sony and NEC both make. Since there are 60 million mobile phone users now in Japan, this is
potentially a big market, but is also culturally driven as Japan is still a cash society and consumers don’t like to use credit cards
over phones. So the convenience store acts as a delivery and payment mechanism via cash, ATM or direct account debiting via
in-store terminals. Customers pick-up items at the store while SEJ shares payment fees currently going to post office or banks.
This initiative also expands IY’s on-line book venture with Softbank. In addition, terminals will give high quality instant photo
finishing for digital cameras. Eventually IY hopes to expand these service to stores in Asia and U.S. but as yet there is no
announced timetable.
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investment or to possibly impact their own brand. So strong inter-firm relationships in apparel
may be problematic.
The Case of H.E. Butt
As a possible comparison case to IY, the University of Minnesota food industry center
suggested H.E. Butt (HEB). However, as a privately held company, they declined to participate
in the project. Nevertheless, their approach to using IT to improve competitiveness offers some
interesting comparisons and contrasts with IY’s approach in both Japan and the U.S., the latter
through SE’s ownership of Southland Corporation, which controls Seven-Eleven in the U.S.
HEB currently operates over 200 full-service supermarkets throughout central and south
Texas, with average sales per store of approximately $300,000 per week. Information technology
has long been an important part of the company’s strategy for controlling costs and keeping
prices low. HEB has definitely been a leader in adopting POS (Point of Sale) scanning. Having
started in the1970s, it installed scanner systems in its all stores during 1980s.  With the
introduction of POS scanners and the data they provided, the use of information system became
essential to its store operations. In addition, HEB was one of the first companies to team up with
P&G in a Continuous Replenishment (CRP) relationship, starting in 1989. As explained above
for ECR, the logic of CRP was that P&G would supply HEB with products based directly upon
the data of warehouse shipments and inventories, rather than upon the receipt of purchase orders
from HEB. Using HEB-provided warehouse and inventory data, P&G could determine the
quantity needed, assemble the delivery, and notify HEB electronically that the shipment was
coming. This process of ordering, delivery, and shipment contrasts with SEJ's procedure,
because, as explained above, HEB does not need to do any ordering. At the same time, they have
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less flexibility to not order or to change what they order in response to particular circumstances
or events.
The information on retail store product demand is electronically transmitted to the
manufacturer (P&G) daily. This continuous demand information then provides much quicker and
more accurate feedback on actual consumer demand to P&G than the traditional ordering
process. Further, by directly coupling their information systems, HEB and P&G eliminated six to
ten days from the previous order cycle. In addition, P&G agreed to give HEB the average deal-
price paid during the prior year for all products. This long-term, net-price deal eliminated the
incentive for forward buying and facilitated the adoption of the CRP innovation. It also assured
HEB that it would share the benefits to P&G of system cooperation and coordination, and that its
competitors would not receive a better price.  That is, this is a mutually beneficial reward system.
Other very important benefits for HEB were a dramatic reduction in inventory levels and
reduced ordering and logistics costs in routinely supplying its warehouses. The benefits to P&G
included more predictable demand and smoother manufacturing processes, in addition to reduced
logistics costs. The success with P&G encouraged HEB to initiate similar relationships with
other vendors. Negotiating and establishing such CRP relationships with new vendors required
as long as one year for vendors without prior CRP experience, but less than two months for those
with prior experience. HEB sometimes provided coaching to ease the transition for new CPR
vendors to its systems and processes, often by installing new software ordering programs or
forecasting tools.
The Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system was initially developed only for CRP
partners to link with HEB. However, using a mainframe system, HEB was able to expand EDI
for transmitting purchase orders to over 500 non-CRP vendors within eight months, and at little
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additional system’s cost. The shift to EDI now covered 80% of purchase orders issued by the
company and simplified the ordering system. Further, 96% of their grocery purchase orders were
transmitted via EDI or via EDI-enabled CPR linkages by mid-1994. HEB has also tried to
expand new vendor’s use of the CRP approach to product replenishment, and by August 1994,
almost 60% of all grocery replenishment volume used CRP. In spite of this rapid expansion of
vendors using CRP, though, HEB still intentionally limited CRP use to only those suppliers
willing to cooperate with it to reduce the total channel costs it had to bear. This is similar to IY’s
requirement that its suppliers bear the cost of establishing their physical supply centers and that
their IT systems to be linked to IY’s. One example of HEB’s intentionally limiting CRP adoption
was its decision not to allow a vendor to become a CRP partner until they had resolved the
possibility of problems with damaged products through improper pallet loading. Thus, both firms
have used IT linkages to affect supplier behavior and to tie suppliers more closely to their
business strategies and information systems.
Some Conclusions
Using various vendors and some packaged systems offered by firms such as Symbol, BA
Merchant Services, BuyPass, Inter-Act, DataSage, and Systech (Supermarket Technology 1999),
it is possible for retailers to introduce cutting edge IT if they believe it can return high benefits.
However, to retain these benefits and not have them competed away by others doing the same
thing, they have to manage at least two obstacles. First, they need to have well-functioning inter-
firm relationships with their suppliers (Reve and Stern 1986). The performance of such inter-
organizational forms relies on two dimensions. One is the relationship between the retailer and
its suppliers. SE Japan and its daily food suppliers is an ideal one from this perspective and is a
"closed system" (Yahagi 1994), or controlled production paradigm (Rapp 1999). Second,
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retailers must manage an efficient delivery system for the merchandise and services sold. This
now requires using IT as a prerequisite. However, even if a perfect IT system is introduced both
for intra-firm and inter-firm transactions, it will be useless unless the delivery system matches
the IT system. For example, unless there is a physical and personnel organization match to
technology, there will be inefficient delivery and warehouse use. So, the second obstacle retailers
and their suppliers must manage, in order to realize a reduction in inventory costs from
introducing sophisticated IT systems, is efficient delivery and good warehousing organizations.
In addition, they need well-managed stores that feed the appropriate information to the system.
IY’s success has been due to its ability to dynamically couple and link these physical and
personnel requirements with its IT systems.
There are many similarities between efficient retailing practices in Japan and the U.S.
Two main differences are who controls the ordering. SE Japan applies "micro-merchandising" in
that the retail shops can order goods, while H.E. Butt or Wal-Mart is subject to automatic
ordering in which suppliers directly replenish merchandise on the basis of information received
from the retailer’s store. The second difference is in how to control and allocate shelf space. SEJ
watches the merchandise on shelves or the services offered in its stores on an item-by-item,
service-by-service basis, while U.S. ECR system assumes category management. These
differences may or may not matter for the performance of particular retailers, but they probably
do affect how inter-firm relationships with suppliers are designed, depending on the constraints
affecting individual retailers. A possible mapping of inter-firm relationships is given below for
the cases explained and analyzed above.
47







H.E. Butt & its
suppliers
Benefit to retailers strong strong relatively strong strong
Benefits to suppliers strong weak relatively weak strong
Formalization strong weak very weak weak
Centralization strong relatively weak none weak
Future  Oriented Strategies: How will E-commerce Change Retailing?12
Even though its manifestation in Japan may evolve differently from that in the U.S., E-
commerce will definitely change retailers' business strategies in Japan, as it has in the U.S. It
may bypass the function of retailers, because, in the near future situation, it might be that
consumers will directly order food and other merchandise over the net, and then the merchandise
will be directly delivered to consumers. It is already popular to order some items such as books
and CDs through the Internet. The IY group has already started to respond to this change. Seven
Eleven Japan has established joint ventures such as E-Shopping Books with Softbank, Tohan,
and Yahoo Japan or Car Points with Softbank, Microsoft, and Yahoo Japan in 1999. Seven
Eleven Japan has also started providing clearing services for purchasing through the Internet
jointly with Nomura Research Institute. As noted above, it has just applied for a banking
business license to specialize in clearing and money transfer functions, so as to make most use of
its strong network of stores. NRI, Sony, NEC, Sanwa Bank, and Mitsubishi/BOT have joined in
this proposed joint venture. At the same time, they are also focusing m re on businesses abroad,
having begun in China, while changing their U.S. subsidiary’s name from Southland to Seven-
Eleven in April 1999. They especially intend to put more effort in the U.S., showing that Mr.
Suzuki is willing to test the effectiveness of IY’s "demand chain management" and CP strategy
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there, against the "supply chain management" philosophy of ECR that has been dominating U.S.
retail thinking.
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Appendix I
SUMMARY ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR IY GROUP
QUESTIONS YES NO NOT
CLEAR
A GENERAL MANAGEMENT& CORPORATE
STRATEGY
1 Has the firm integrated software into their management
strategy, including using it to institutionalize organizational
strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis?
x
2 Has the firm succeeded solely on the basis of its software
strategy?
x
3 Does the firm believe some customized software and its
close organizational integration enables the company to
capture and perpetuate on a more consistent basis certain
tacit knowledge and unique corporate features, i.e. core
competencies, that account for its continued success in the
marketplace with reliability and repetition important
elements in their thinking?
x
4 Is the firm’s software strategy successful because it is a well
managed company that introduces software innovation
when it serves corporate goals for enhancing productivity,
inventory management or customer relations within its
industry?
x
5 Does the firm generally meet established criteria as a quality
organization such as: effective organizational self
assessment, use of project and especially cross functional
teams, improving quality outcomes through reducing
uncertainty, rapidly diffusing learning throughout the
organization including the use of software and information
technology, effective implementation of organizational and
technical change, facilitating change via evolution rather
than revolution or reengineering, emphasizing participatory
management, having process excellence, using value added
analysis, actively doing benchmarking, constant
organizational improvement, commitment to concrete
x
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realistic goals, effectively managing a dynamic iterative
experimental process through goal setting, training and
constant consultation?
6 Does the firm plan in detail for world class operational
excellence including the contribution of software and
information technology to the allocation of resources?
x
7 Do their planning systems enable management to make
better business, operating and resource allocation decisions,
including those related to software and IT, with a link to
resource valuation techniques?
x
8 Do they focus on a small number of priorities, usually three
or fewer, with a well-defined, cascaded system reaching
from the commitment of senior management to the
department level with associated metrics?
x
9 Is the firm a “high performance” workplace for services?x
10 Is there a heavy emphasis on improving process through
using software?
x
B INDUSTRY RELATED QUESTIONS
11 Are industry economics and competitive dynamics
important strategic drivers for the firm and for its use of
software and information technology in that IT has been
adapted to the firm’s particular industry and competitive
situation?
x
12 Do industry paradoxes exist such as: declining stock prices,
manufacturing improvements that create product






13 Is software a significant and successful input into the firm’s
competitive performance?
x
14 Does the firm explicitly and consciously perceive the
implications of their software strategies and use on their
competitiveness and business success?
x
15 Are there direct links between SW strategies & firm goals?x
16 Do customers, affiliates, competitors, industry analysts,
government officials, industry associations and suppliers




17 Has the firm gained first mover advantages through
successfully introducing software-related innovations?
x
D INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
18 Is firm a sophisticated software user that consciously
designs and implements a software strategy to achieve
competitive advantage?
x
19 Does the firms utilize several types of software input alone
or in combination to achieve competitive advantage?
x
20 Does the firm’s system work to rapidly uncover barriers to
implementation, including using new or improved software,
while generating cross-functional and hierarchical
consensus so measured goals can be achieved?
x
21 Is leadership at different levels actively involved in driving
software planning, assessment and deployment with regular
progress reviews that link plans, goals, benchmarks,




22 Does the system allow for flexibility and innovation as well
as change and individual efforts provided they meet goal,
planning and metric criteria?
x
23 Is there a clear vision making project and new product
software selection straightforward and closely related to




24 Does this software strategy involve a conscious and clearly
defined reliance on customized and semi-customized
software in addition to packaged software with specific
criteria and goals for selecting each type, and do they have
ways to measure this so that the firm knows customized
software achieves functional or market gains that justify the
additional expense, including related costs of integrating





25 Does the firm use option valuation methods to manage
uncertain and random outcomes since this appears to be at





26 Does their strategy include increased use, development and
integration of industry and company specific vertical
application software and embedded software in its




27 If the firm has an embedded SW strategy, is this integrated
or interactive with their other software and overall business
strategy in ways affecting production, product design or









29 Does the firm believe large-scale outsourcing by many US
companies assumes those firms’ information systems
development need not be integrated with their business
organization and that they view their information systems as
generic products best developed by outside vendors who









30 Do they in turn believe this is a mistake by their competitors
that gives them a long-term and sustainable competitive
advantage over such companies because they believe
outsourcing surrenders a firm’s strategic software options
since systems service companies have an incentive to
develop increasingly standardized products and are one step









31 Has the firm established a software strategy that is open and
interactive with its customers and/or suppliers?
x





E INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS
33 Do participants own goals and are then committed to
implementation strategies?
x
34 Does the firm embed software into its production and
delivery processes with competitive market implications?
x
35 Is software technology tied to high speed
telecommunications technology, allowing the firm to track,
receive and deliver shipments or services directly or on-line
without further handling or processing?
x
36 Does it manage potential risks of extensive use of SW or
open systems?
x





38 Is informal interaction key part planning & implementation?x, user
contact
NRI
39 Is firm’s system institutionalized & self-reinforcing with
good communication and consensus building while SW and
IT play a role, including preventing retrospective
justification or target reduction?
x
F HUMAN RESOURCE & ORGANIZATION ISSUES
40 Does the firm pay close attention to systems training and
organizational integration for all employees, reducing errors
through improved consistency and staffing efficiencies








41 Does certain software require special HR competencies or
education?
x
42 Does the firm try to change human behavior to use
software?
x
G PARAMETER METRICS (INVENTORY, CYCLE
TIMES, & COST REDUCTION)
43 Are goals or targets tightly linked to regularly reviewed
metrics with inputs coming from all levels that are often
cross-functional affecting large parts of the organization,
e.g. cycle times, on-time delivery, and customer
satisfaction?
x
44 Does the firm have standard agreed ways to explicitly
organize or manage this software selection process?
x
45 Does the firm have agreed ways to measure and evaluate
success in using software to promote business objectives
such as unit cost, inventories, lower receivables, market
share, model development times, or product pipeline?
x
46 Are IT costs balanced against long-term productivity gains?x
47 Does the firm have methods to ensure increased
customization costs result in lower costs downstream so that
developing and using customized software makes sense?
x
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48 Has the firm created large interactive databases to allow
automatic feedback between stages or players in the
production and delivery process? And are these databases
constantly being refined and updated on an interactive basis
with actual performance results in a real time global
environment? Are there competitive and metric impacts of
this? such as reducing inventory costs and wastage while
improving the quality of customer service?
x
49 Has the firm used software to create beneficial feedback
cycles that increase productivity, reduce cycle times and
defects, and integrate production and delivery processes?
x
50 Do other firms or analysts have alternative measures of
competitiveness or views on appropriate industry strategy?
x, ECR
51 Has the firm achieved better than industry growth, superior
on-time delivery, improved inventory control, reduced
down-time or changeover cycles, reduced product or
process defects, fewer recalls, lower warranty claims, an
improved product development process, and/or any other
definite and measurable progress relative to competitors?
x
52 Do the firm’s metrics go beyond financial to areas like
customer satisfaction, operational performance, and human
resources?
x
53 Does their evaluation system apply to new product




H SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Yes No Not
Clear
54 Can you summarize a mission statement on the role and
impact of software as a tool of competitive advantage for




55 Is it consistent with the strategies identified as successful or
appropriate in the existing competitiveness research from
Sloan’s industry study center?
x
56 Are there important business or IT situations that require
further research?
x
57 Are intellectual property issues important in explaining the
successful and sustainable use of software to achieve
competitive advantage?
x
58 Are beneficial cost impacts generally one important
consequence of a successful software strategy?
x
59 Does this company fit a profile where software seems most
likely to contribute to enhanced competitiveness?
x
60 Based on these studies is the market for vertical application
and embedded software growing?
x
61 Since Japanese competitors normally do not outsource, do





62 Does this leading Japanese firm assign positive value to
improved integration and enhanced control through
selective customization?
x
63 Do general measures such as increased productivity, as
evidenced by reduced cycle times and lower defect rates,
reflect the benefits of a successful software strategy?
x
64 Are the benefits of a successful software strategy also
reflected in specific industry standards such as an expanded
customer base, or improved yields?
x
65 Does this leading IT user have criteria for selecting package
vs. customized SW and semi-customizing SW packages?
x
66 Does this firm closely integrate or couple its software and
business strategies beyond mere alignment?
x
67 Does this firm closely integrate its organizational and HR
policies with its software systems?
x
57








69 Has IY’s software codified or built on existing
organizational strengths or core competencies including HR
alignment with business and IT strategies?
x
70 Has IY embraced and integrated IT as part of its business
strategies and core competencies?
x
71 Is IY’s MIS department integrated with the rest of the firm












SOME FIRM AND INDUSTRY DATA
TABLE 1
Summary of Recent Performance (unconsolidated)
Ito-Yokado and Seven-Eleven Japan
Year ended February 28 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Ito-Yokado
Net sales (million of yen) 1,521,428 1,523,303 1,527,912 1,528,755 1,529,716
    growth rate (%) 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
Net income (million of yen) 46,759 44,708 45,714 43,147 41,332
    growth rate (%) -14.7 -4.4 2.3 -5.6 -4.2
Earnings per share (yen) 113.1 107.9 110.2 103.9 99.5
    growth rate (%)
Seven-Eleven Japan
-14.8 -4.6 2.1 -5.7 -4.3
Net sales (million of yen) 1,281,931 1,392,312 1,477,126 1,609,007 1,740,960
    growth rate (%) 7.3 8.6 6.1 8.9 8.2
Net income (million of yen) 46,555 49,525 52,562 55,317 58,254
    growth rate (%) 3.4 6.4 6.1 5.2 5.3
Earnings per share (yen) 111.8 118.9 126.2 132.8 139.9
    growth rate (%) 3.4 6.4 6.1 5.2 5.3
Source: Ito-Yokado Group, Investors' Guide (1998)
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TABLE 2









1992 6.8% 1.8% 16.1% 9.7%
1993 3.2% 5.1% 10.4% 9.6%
1994 1.2% 5.3% 7.3% 8.6%
1995 2.0% 5.1% 8.6% 8.4%
1996 2.9% 6.9% 6.1% 8.6%
1997 -0.1% 5.1% 8.9% 8.6%
1998 0.1% 6.1% 8.2% 6.9%
Sources: Company Reports and Nikko Research Center (1998)
TABLE 3-1













1992 6.8% 46.8% 5.0% 4.2% 9.3% 6.1%
1993 3.2% -0.7% 2.9% 0.0% 2.8% 2.1%
1994 1.2% 2.5% 7.8% -5.3% -1.8% 1.5%
1995 2.0% 22.5% 11.9% -0.8% -3.4% 6.7%
1996 2.9% -16.9% 5.8% 0.4% 9.5% 5.2%
1997 -0.1% -2.9% 10.1% -1.9% 6.1% 11.0%
Source: Nikko Research Center (1998)
TABLE 3-2














1992 1.8% 12.0% 1.6% 0.8% 4.1% 2.4%
1993 5.1% 5.9% 2.4% 2.7% 6.4% 3.0%
1994 5.3% 4.3% 11.0% 4.4% 5.4% 3.5%
1995 5.1% 47.1% 14.9% 5.3% 8.0% 1.4%
1996 6.9% 5.7% 11.5% 1.5% 9.4% 6.0%
1997 5.1% 7.6% 13.0% 1.0% 5.7% 13.6%
Source: Nikko Research Center (1998)
TABLE 3-3
Annual sales growth rate (%) net of floor space growth of the six GMS
Ito-Yokado Daiei Jusco Seiyu Mycal Uny
1992 5.1% 34.8% 3.5% 3.4% 5.1% 3.6%
1993 -1.9% -6.6% 0.5% -2.7% -3.5% -0.9%
1994 -4.1% -1.7% -3.2% -9.7% -7.2% -2.0%
1995 -3.1% -24.7% -3.0% -6.1% -11.4% 5.3%
1996 -4.1% -22.6% -5.7% -1.0% 0.1% -0.9%
1997 -5.2% -10.5% -2.9% -2.9% 0.4% -2.6%
Source: Adapted from Nikko Research Center (1998)
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TABLE 4











Sales (million yen) 1,740,9601,093,800710,095 380,504 282,303 153,755 93,289 77,963
Net income (million yen) 58,254 -87,800 6,004 7,081 2,506 2,794 -152 388
Recurring profit margin (%) 6.4 3.2 3.5 3.4 2.0 3.6 0.3 1.1
SG&A cost ration (%) 7.9 N.A. 11.7 10.9 11.3 11.9 11.6 14.9
Number of stores 7,362 6,649 4,242 2,168 1,588 997 844 513
Daily sales per store (1,000 yen) 67.6 N.A. 48.6 50.7 51.7 45.5 35.3 50.6
Source: Nikko Research Center (1998)
TABLE 5-1
Number of Stores by Area of the six GMS (as of 1997)
Ito-Yokado Daiei Jusco Seiyu Mycal Uny
Tokyo area 96 116 14 126 27 21
  % of the total 60.8% 30.9% 5.9% 63.0% 19.0% 15.8%
Nagoya area 5 13 44 6 4 68
  % of the total 3.2% 3.5% 18.6% 3.0% 2.8% 51.1%
Osaka area 2 102 63 28 65 -
  % of the total 1.3% 27.2% 26.6% 14.0% 45.8% -
Other areas 55 144 116 40 46 44
  % of the total 34.8% 38.4% 48.9% 20.0% 32.4% 33.1%
Total  number of stores 158 375 237 200 142 133
TABLE 5-2





Circle K Ministop Kasumi
Conv.
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Tokyo area 2,871 1,906 116 665 198
  % of the total 41.5% 49.9% 6.4% 76.3% 23.0%
Nagoya area 0 369 1082 161 0
  % of the total 0.0% 9.7% 59.9% 18.5% 0.0%
Osaka area 168 800 185 0 0
  % of the total 2.4% 21.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Other areas 3883 741 610 45 664
  % of the total 51.6% 19.4% 33.8% 5.2% 77.0%
Total  number of stores 6,922 3,816 1,806 871 862
Note: Tokyo area consists of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures.
          Nagoya area consists of Aichi, Gifu, and Mie prefectures.
          Osaka area consists of Osaka, Kyoto, Nara, and Hyogo prefectures.
Source: Nikko Research Center (1998)
Table 5-3
Stock Market Performance IY Group
June 1999 Leading Retailer: P/E 62 compared low
30s for competitors due daily turnover
per store of $5800 versus $4200  for
competitors and profit margin 21% compared
to 8% for competitors
March 2000 IY and SEJ  account two-thirds market
capitalization of retail companies listed
1st Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange
Source: SmartMoney, June 1999 and Asahi Evening News,  March 3, 2000
TABLE 6-1









1. Wal-Mart (U.S.) 106,417 19.1 3,056 13.7
2. Sears, Roebuck (U.S.) 38,236 -7.8 1,271 -0.1
3. Metro (Germany) 36,568 - 406 -
4. Kmart (U.S.) 31,437 -2.1 -220 -
5. Carrefour (France) 30,277 11.2 610 23.3
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6. Daiei (Japan) 28,281 8.4 -107 -
7. Ito-Yokado (Japan) 27,137 4.3 668 3.9
8. Dayton Hudson (U.S.) 25,371 9.5 463 9.0
9. Kroger (U.S.) 25,171 3.3 350 34.3
10. J.C. Penny (U.S.) 23,649 6.5 565 47.8
Seven-Eleven Japan (Japan) 14,464 12.1 497 10.2
Southland Corp. (U.S.) 6,869 -3.0 90 1.6
Note: CAGR: Compound annual growth rate of 1991-1996 (US$ base)
Source: Ito-Yokado Group, Investors’ Guide (1998)
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TABLE 6-2











1. Wal-Mart (U.S.) 114,120 1.33 104,859 3,056 2.9
2. Home Depot (U.S.) 49,471 1.30 19,536 938 4.8
3. Seven-Eleven Japan (Japan) 28,533 1.05 12,121 438 3.6
4. Marks & Spencer (U.K.) 28,217 44.89 13,136 1,268 9.7
5. Carrefour (France) 22,666 13.59 27,276 578 2.1
6. Sears, Roebuck (U.S.) 22,516 3.18 41,469 1,303 3.1
7. Ito-Yokado (Japan) 22,487 1.34 22,631 557 2.5
8. Tesco (U.K.) 21,854 40.37 23,261 871 3.7
9. Dayton Hudson (U.S.) 19,233 2.09 25,371 474 1.9
10. J.C. Penny (U.S.) 18,917 3.32 23,471 793 3.4
Source: Ito-Yokado Group, Investors’ Guide (1998)
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TABLE 7
Seven-Eleven Japan: Five-year financial statistics
Year ended February 28 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
For the year (millions of yen)
Total store sales 1,281,932 1,392,312 1,477,127 1,609,007 1,740,961
Revenue from operations 195,668 214,560 231,227 254,617 277,186
Net income (loss)
At year-end (millions of yen)
46,555 49,525 52,563 55,317 58,255
Total Assets 395,431 443,347 489,299 546,040 603,307
Total shareholders' equity 278,864 316,648 356,440 397,744 439,411
Per share of common stock (yen)
Net income 111.8 118.9 126.2 132.8 139.9
Cash dividends
    Adjusted 26.3 28.9 31.8 38.0 42.0
    Unadjusted 35.0 35.0 35.0 38.0 42.0
Stock price
    High 6,975 7,074 7,000 7,760 9,500
    Low 4,718 5,427 5,236 6,450 7,050
Number of stores
     Franchisee operated 5,324 5,720 6,179 6,644 7,076
     Corporation operated 199 232 241 278 286
Number of employees 2,182 2,364 2,538 2,718 3,037
Source: Seven-Eleven Japan, Annual Report 1998.
